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1. The activist’s perspective 
Issues like climate change, massive inequality, or threatening fascism pose collective practical 
problems: problems that will only be resolved if a great many people contribute. People who 
make substantial efforts to help resolve such problems often take what I will call “the activist’s 
perspective,” thinking that:  
 
COLLECTIVE CAPABILITY: Together, we can significantly resolve the issue (at an acceptable 
cost).  
COLLECTIVE OBLIGATION: In virtue of COLLECTIVE CAPABILITY, we have a moral 
obligation to significantly resolve the issue.  
RESULTING INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS: The considerations that ground this collective 
obligation also ground individual prima facie moral obligations to help resolve the issue, 
at least when there is a high enough chance that it will be significantly resolved. 
 
The first two elements of the activist’s perspective attribute capability and obligations to some 
relevant group of agents. In the case of climate change, for example, it might include all affluent 
contemporaries; in the case of racism, members of the racist society in question. Importantly, 
these attributions seem to be non-distributive: they do not imply that each individual member can 
significantly resolve the issue or has an obligation to do so. By contrast, the third element does 
attribute obligations to the individuals in the group. 
 COLLECTIVE CAPABILITY is exactly the sort of fact that motivates activism (see e.g. Van 
Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008), likely in part because it is seen as giving rise to collective 
and individual obligations. Admittedly, explicit ideas about “obligations” might play little role 
in some activists’ thinking about collective practical problems. But consider failures to resolve 
such problems: to significantly decrease the risk or extent of climate catastrophe, or prevent a 
fascist takeover of a constitutional democracy, say. My impression is that the typical activist 
thinks that many such failures would be failures to live up to what is morally required of us: we 
have to resolve these issues and would be to blame if we failed. Similarly, the perspective involves 
the sense that one would be at least somewhat to blame if one did nothing to help in spite of 
being aware of the issue, particularly well placed to contribute to its resolution at a low cost, 
and not already occupied with similarly important tasks. 
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2. Two problems of individual incapability and group agency 
The activist’s perspective seems both prevalent and important in motivating collective action. 
But it can also seem theoretically deeply problematic. The first problem has to do with the sheer 
scale of the collective issues in question:  
 
INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY: With few exceptions, no action by an individual human agent 
can significantly affect whether the issue is resolved. 
  
For example, however successful we will be in preventing or reducing the threat of global 
climate catastrophe, the extent of that success is unlikely to have been much affected by my 
actions. The same seems true for most moral agents, including most that the activist’s 
perspective is concerned with. In light of INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY, it might also seem that 
 
NO INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION: Because of INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY, the importance of 
resolving the issue at hand and our collective capacity to do so cannot ground individual 
obligations to act in ways aimed at achieving resolution (see e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; 
Nefsky 2011; but cf. Nefsky 2016). 
 
This directly contradicts RESULTING INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS. Of course, individuals might 
have other reasons to contribute: perhaps contributing might show solidarity with others who 
contribute, or be a way to take on a fair share of the burdens involved (for discussion, see e.g. 
Brennan and Sayre-McCord 2015). But this does not seem to fully capture the obvious 
teleological elements of the activist’s efforts to contribute to the collective end. 
 The second problem with the activist’s perspective concerns COLLECTIVE OBLIGATION. As 
already noted, it should not be understood as implying that any individual in the group has an 
obligation to resolve the issue, as such resolution is beyond the capacity of any or most individual 
agents. But the claim also seems deeply problematic if it attributes obligations to the group. So 
understood, it seems to conflict with the appealing thought that 
 
AGENCY REQUIREMENT: Only moral agents are subject to moral obligations. 
 
The AGENCY REQUIREMENT does not rule out all attributions of obligations to groups. Many 
have argued that groups can constitute bona fide moral agents: correctly organized, they can 
have their own beliefs, goals, rational point of view, and capacity for self-regulation, free choice, 
moral thinking, and moral motivation (see e.g. French 1984; List and Pettit 2011; Hess 2014; 
Björnsson and Hess 2017; for an overview, see Tollefsen 2015). It is also clear that massive 
problems have been resolved when people have organized in such complex ways, not least by 
forming states. However, it is not clear how a group can have obligations when, like the groups 
of COLLECTIVE OBLIGATION, it has not yet organized in this way (see e.g. Collins 2013; 
Lawford-Smith 2015; for discussion of the problem and proposed solutions, see Björnsson 
Forthcoming). Moreover, even if the groups in question can be understood as agents or potential 
agents, this looks unlikely to help make sense of the activist’s perspective. Activists are concerned 
with how to reach out and engage other individuals in these groups, have in mind how difficult 
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it is for individuals to contribute, and think about what can be achieved if individuals can be 
motivated by the moral urgency of the issue at hand. It is not central to the perspective that all 
relevant agents organize around some one plan or accept the same decision-making procedure. 
Climate catastrophe prevention, for instance, will realistically happen through a wide variety of 
actions motivated by the threats of climate change, actions which, although often locally 
coordinated, will not necessarily be guided by one global master plan or procedure to which all 
or even most agents sign on. It is just not part of this picture that the group is or will become a 
moral agent in its own right, much less that it already satisfies standard requirements of moral 
agency.1 
 The task of this paper is to explain how, in spite of problems of individual incapability and 
group agency, COLLECTIVE OBLIGATION and RESULTING INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION are 
coherent and sensible, in particular with respect to climate obligations. In other work, I have 
suggested that we should understand the relevant kind of collective obligation as shared 
obligation (Björnsson 2014a, Forthcoming; cf. Aas 2015; Schwenkenbecher 2014). Though the 
groups in question are not themselves moral agents, they can straightforwardly have obligations 
because their members are such agents—or so I have argued. In sections 3 and 4, I begin by 
briefly recounting and motivating a general understanding of individual obligations before 
explaining how it naturally yields an account of shared obligations. In sections 5 and 6, I then 
explain how this understanding of obligations lets us make sense of the activist’s perspective, in 
spite of INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY.  
 My ambition is to show that the activist’s perspective on our climate related obligations is 
coherent and sensible in spite of the apparent problems, not necessarily that it is correct. For 
this reason, I take a number of things for granted, most obviously the reality of anthropogenic 
climate change and the moral importance of the threat it poses. In sections 5 and 6, I rely on 
further normative assumptions, sometimes based on intuitions about cases. I provide no defense 
for these assumptions apart from appealing to some initial intuitive support, as one can agree 
that the perspective is coherent and sensible without ultimately accepting its normative content.  
  
 
3. Obligations 
Can collectives that do not themselves constitute moral agents have moral obligations? To 
answer this question, we are helped by a clear general understanding of what moral obligations 
are. Unfortunately for our purposes, there are several notions of moral obligation, and 
philosophers variously appeal to objective and subjective obligations, and to all-things-considered, prima 
facie, and pro tanto obligations. On top of that, talk of what one must do is famously context 
dependent.2 In what follows, I will therefore propose an explication of one sort of phenomenon 
that we have in mind when talking of obligations in moral contexts. The analysis of collective 
                                               
1 For one recent book-length treatment of climate obligations that attributes important such obligations 
to non-agential groups, see Cripps 2013. 
2 The locus classicus is Kratzer 1977; for my own understanding of the distinction between must and ought, 
see Björnsson and Shanklin 2014. 
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obligations that I propose based on this will then have to be expanded to cover other species of 
moral obligation.  
 Abstractly, we can say that our obligations are what can be properly demanded of us, with 
moral and legal obligations being what can be properly morally and legally demanded of us, 
respectively. What can be morally demanded is a matter of what can be demanded on moral 
grounds, but demands come in different forms, where failures to satisfy the demand have 
different consequences. Trivially and generically, one must satisfy moral ideals on pain of being 
morally non-ideal. Certain more specific moral demands must be satisfied on pain of making one a 
fitting target of moral blame in the form of guilt (in the first-personal case) or indignation. (To the extent that 
such demands permit actions that are morally non-ideal, they allow for supererogatory actions: 
actions that are morally better than what is demanded.) Other demands must be satisfied on pain 
of making one a fitting target of sanctions or attempts to force us to comply that are more hands-on than basic 
expressions of negative reactive attitudes. (To the extent that such demands allow for acts that merit 
blame, they allow for suberogatory actions: actions that are permitted but still blameworthy.3) 
Partly for convenience, and partly because I think these to be an important part of common 
sense as well as the activist’s perspective, my focus here will be on demands the violations of 
which normally ground blame. In this section, focus is on individual obligations. 
 
INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION & BLAME: X has a moral obligation to φ if and only if X would 
be morally to blame for not φ-ing.4 
 
To better understand this notion of obligations, we will be helped by an account of when one is 
to blame for not φ-ing. Ideally, such an account should help us explain a number of general 
facts about moral obligations. One is that someone is required to do something only if doing it 
is in some relevant sense under her control (“ought implies can”). Another is that obligations 
take a variety of objects, at least as far as ordinary moral thinking goes: ordinary actions and 
omissions as well as various cognitive and emotional reactions or lack thereof.  
 Such general facts can be accounted for if we follow an influential tradition of taking 
blameworthiness to be grounded in the agent’s “quality of will”: 
 
QUALITY OF WILL: One is blameworthy insofar as the object of blame – what one is blamed 
for – is an “expression” of a bad quality of will (e.g. Strawson 1962; Arpaly 2006; 
McKenna 2012).  
 
                                               
3 For the category of the suberogatory, see Driver 1992. There are more possibilities: demands that must 
be satisfied on pain of (i) being a fitting target of moral protest, where this need not involve moral 
indignation (Smith 2013), (ii) not living up to a standard that should be actively encouraged, where 
encouragement is different from threats of blame or protest should one fall short, or (iii) not doing what 
an ideal moral advisor, or any morally reasonable person, would want one to do in the circumstances. 
4 This notion of obligation leaves no room for failures to discharge an obligation that are excused due to 
stress, duress, or disease. If such conditions leave X blameless for not φ-ing, then they also render it false 
that X had to φ in the relevant sense. For notions that allow for excuses, see the end of this section and n. 
17. 
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As this tradition has made clear, paradigmatic cases of blaming involve thinking that someone 
did something bad because she didn’t care enough about morally relevant considerations. 
Conversely, a bad action is typically excused when the agent did it because of external forces or 
because she was ignorant of crucial information, rather than because of a lack of concern with 
or respect for the values involved. 
 Though the general idea is powerful in itself, some precisifications and qualifications are in 
place. 
 First, there are various ways in which one might understand quality of will. I take it that 
blameworthiness is grounded in failures to care about certain things in the right way, where 
 
CARING: To care about some object in some regard is to be disposed to notice factors 
relevant to how well it goes with the object in that regard and to invest resources to 
promote it. 
 
Quality of will accounts can accept this but differ in what objects one needs to care about for 
one’s will to be good: total wellbeing, justice, or one’s own happiness, relations, character, or 
avoidance of certain actions or intentions, to mention some possibilities.  
 Second, not any non-ideal caring is bad or lacking in a way that grounds blame. We are not 
blameworthy for every action falling short of ideal virtue. Rather, the caring must fall below 
some relevant standard, with normative force to back up demands that agents satisfy it and 
blame when their behavior expresses substandard caring. Moreover, standards do not apply 
uniformly to all agents or at all times. Most obviously, indignation seems misplaced when 
directed at an agent who lacks the capacities required for caring about certain things—certain 
core elements of social and moral cognition, say. More subtly, such capacities come in degrees, 
and the degree of caring that is demanded might vary accordingly. Furthermore, that degree 
will depend on the importance of the object of care, and on one’s relation to that object (for an 
overview of relevant relationships, see Björnsson and Brülde 2017). Quality of will accounts can 
accept all this but differ with respect to whether they take standards for caring to be grounded 
in some further considerations, such as rational agency, hypothetical contracts, or costs and 
consequences of imposing such standards. 
 Third, not any event expressive of substandard caring is a relevant object of blame. The 
object of blame must itself be morally bad, i.e. of a kind that we have moral reason to prevent. 
For example, an agent might not be to blame for an expression of substandard caring about his 
father during free association therapy. As with objects and standards of caring, a quality of will 
account can accept a variety of objects of blame, including not only clear cases of harm, rights 
violations, or suboptimal outcomes, but also attempts to cause harm and failures to notice or be 
motivated by some morally relevant fact. 
 Finally, the object of blame needs to be explained in a normal way by the substandard caring, 
not through some random chain of events (Björnsson 2014a, 114–15; Björnsson and Persson 
2012, 330–31). The normal way in which substandard caring explains a bad event (action or 
outcome) is by explaining agents’ failures to recognize or be motivated by the fact that their 
behavior would either contribute to this bad event or allow for other, preventable, events that 
do so. In the simplest case, the bad event is explained by a single instance of substandard caring. 
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But many bad events, such as the deterioration of trust among people or failures to complete a 
task at a promised time, are upshots of several such instances, sometimes on part of several 
people.  
 The resulting version of the quality of will account is that 
 
INDIVIDUAL BLAMEWORTHINESS: X is morally to blame for Y if and only if Y is morally 
bad and explained in a normal way by X’s substandard caring (Björnsson and Persson 
2012; Björnsson 2017a, b). 
 
As I have argued elsewhere, this proposal (together with a companion characterization of 
degrees of blameworthiness) accounts for everyday attributions of blameworthiness as well as 
the role of ordinary excuses and justifications in mitigating blameworthiness to various degrees 
(Björnsson 2017a, b). 
 When we conjoin BLAMEWORTHINESS with OBLIGATION & BLAME, it follows that X has a 
moral obligation to φ if and only if X’s not φ-ing would be bad and explained, in a normal way, 
by X’s substandard caring. When is X’s not φ-ing guaranteed to be so explained? Exactly when 
the satisfaction of these standards would ensure, in a normal way, that X φ.5 Hence: 
 
INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION: X has a moral obligation to φ if and only if X’s not φ-ing would 
be morally bad and X’s φ-ing would be ensured, in a normal way, by X’s caring 
appropriately (Björnsson 2014a; Björnsson and Brülde 2017).  
 
Apart from capturing the connection between obligation (of the relevant sort) and blame, 
INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION gives content to the AGENCY REQUIREMENT: for an individual to be 
subject to moral obligations, it must be subject to moral standards of caring, which presumably 
requires the capacity to care about morally important matters to the relevant degrees. Relatedly, 
it straightforwardly accounts for the fact that one has an obligation to φ only if φ-ing is under 
one’s control, or something one can do, in the sense that caring appropriately would ensure, in 
a normal way, that one φ:s. 
 In addition, INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION leaves room for the full range of objects of 
obligations. That one cares appropriately can ensure that one acts or refrains from certain 
actions, but also that one notices or ignores certain things, or has (or lacks) certain cognitive or 
emotional reactions. Moreover, what is ensured might be a series of coordinated actions guided 
by an explicit intention, such as the act of walking over to the stereo and turning down the volume, as well 
as a series of separate and individually motivated actions and omissions that has an overall 
effect, such as the act of letting the neighbor sleep through the night by avoiding activities that make 
much noise throughout the night. It is also worth noting that OBLIGATION allows for a variety 
of substantive views about the objects of appropriate caring, including both impersonal values 
                                               
5 That X’s caring appropriately would ensure X’s φ-ing does not mean that X will φ because X cares 
appropriately. (The presence of a life guard might ensure that no one drowns without preventing anyone 
from drowning.) We often do what we morally must do for non-moral reasons. 
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(total happiness, justice, beauty) and agent-relative matters (not lying, not stealing, not killing, 
being a good human being, citizen, friend, parent, spouse, colleague).6 
 This concludes my introduction of the notion of obligation that will be central to our 
discussion. I stress again that this notion is one among many. Specifically, what INDIVIDUAL 
OBLIGATION aims to capture is a notion of all-things-considered obligations that depend on 
available information and current levels of non-culpable confusion, stress, or duress, rather than 
prima facie, pro tanto, general, or objective obligations. To further bring out what sort of notion 
I have and do not have in mind, I offer the following rough analyses of some neighboring notions 
for contrast: 
 
PRIMA FACIE: X has a prima facie obligation to φ when considerations obtain that would 
characteristically ground an all-things-considered obligation in the absence of contrary 
considerations.  
GENERAL: X has a general obligation to φ, where φ-ing is some general type of action, reaction, 
or absence thereof (e.g. keeping promises, paying attention to offspring, not stealing), if 
and only if X’s caring appropriately involves caring about φ-ing. 
PRO TANTO: X has a pro tanto obligation to φ, where φ-ing is the instantiation of some type 
of action, reaction, or absence thereof in some particular circumstance, if and only if it 
can be properly morally demanded that X cares about φ-ing.7 
OBJECTIVE EXCUSE-FRIENDLY: X has an objective excuse-friendly moral obligation to φ if and 
only if X’s not φ-ing would be morally bad and X’s φ-ing would, in the absence of any 
excusing conditions, be ensured in a normal way by X’s caring appropriately.8 
NON-OBJECTIVE EXCUSE-FRIENDLY: X has a non-objective excuse-friendly moral obligation to 
φ if and only if X’s not φ-ing would be morally bad and X’s φ-ing would, in the absence 
of any excusing conditions other than lack of morally relevant information, be ensured in 
a normal way by X’s caring appropriately. 
 
If something that I say about obligations seems counterintuitive, I urge the reader to make sure 
that the intuitions concern the intended notion of obligation. 
 
                                               
6  Notably, INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION is structurally similar to virtue ethical identifications of right 
actions with actions performed by the virtuous (see e.g. Hursthouse 1999, ch. 2), though it is concern 
with obligations rather than rightness, and appeals to appropriate caring rather than (presumably more 
demanding) agential virtue. For a brief discussion of how INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION might handle some 
problems raised for such accounts, see Björnsson 2014a, 116–17, n13.  
7 GENERAL and PRO TANTO obligations are examples of normative responsibilities to (not) perform certain 
actions, in the terminology of Björnsson and Brülde 2017. 
8 An excusing condition is one that (i) leaves X able to φ but (ii) decreases the shortcoming in caring required 
for X not to φ, other than by providing X with reasons not to φ. A fully excusing condition is one that 
makes it the case, other than by providing X with reasons not to φ, that no such shortcoming is required 
for X not to φ. 
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4. Essentially shared obligations 
Return now to the difficulty of understanding obligations of groups that are not themselves 
moral agents. What I suggest is that such obligations can be adequately understood in terms of 
a simple generalization of INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION, treating the latter as an account of the 
special case involving a single individual: 
 
OBLIGATION: One or more individuals have a moral obligation to φ if and only if their not 
φ-ing would be morally bad and their φ-ing would be ensured, in a normal way, by the 
appropriate caring of them all (Björnsson 2014b, Forthcoming).9 
 
No further adjustments seem to be required to capture obligations of non-agential groups, as 
we see when considering the various parts of the account. 
 First, the behavior of a plurality might obviously be morally bad, i.e. the sort of thing that 
there are moral reasons to prevent. For example, there might be moral reason to prevent a 
group of teenage yahoos from waking up your sweet elderly neighbor, or from abandoning a 
cat helplessly stuck in a tree after they chased it up there, just as there might be reason to prevent 
a single individual from doing those things. 
 Second, OBLIGATION allows for the attribution of obligations to groups that are not 
themselves moral agents in any qualified sense: what is required for group obligations is merely 
that individual members of the group are subject to moral standards of caring. (Though leaving 
room for obligations of non-agential groups, OBLIGATION neatly explains why the AGENCY 
REQUIREMENT holds for the cases where it seems most clearly correct, namely for individual 
obligation bearers, if we equate moral agents with agents that are subject to moral standards of 
caring.) 
 Third, appropriate caring by all members of a group of agents can ensure, in normal ways, 
a certain behavior from the group. If all the teenagers care appropriately about the neighbor, 
this might straightforwardly ensure that each keeps reasonably quiet in the proximity of her 
bedroom and that they thereby keep the noise they collectively make below a certain level. If 
they all care appropriately about the cat, this might similarly ensure that they organize to help 
it down. Notice that whereas coordination and mutual awareness might be required in the 
second case, the first case is different. Here, as in countless other cases, appropriate caring avoids 
cumulative problems by separate efforts of numerous of individuals, efforts that need not be 
made in awareness of the other efforts. This is directly parallel to a typical individual case. It is 
not the teenager’s caring about the neighbor at one specific time that ensures that the neighbor 
                                               
9 OBLIGATION attributes obligations non-distributively: obligations of groups are held together, not 
individually. For related views, see Schwenkenbecher 2018; Aas 2015; Wringe 2016; for discussion of 
these, see Björnsson Forthcoming. Corresponding to this account of obligations for both individual 
agents and groups is the following account of blameworthiness:  
BLAMEWORTHINESS: One or more individuals are morally to blame for Y if and only if Y is 
morally bad and explained in a normal way by substandard caring among those individuals 
(Björnsson Forthcoming, 2011). 
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gets to sleep; it is her caring throughout the night and making efforts to keep the noise down at 
various times, without necessarily being aware at any of those times of her other efforts.10  
 If INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION is correct and generalizes in this way, the teenagers’ moral 
obligation to help the cat down, or not keep the neighbor awake seems perfectly intelligible, 
without assuming that the teenagers together constitute a fully-fledged moral agent. Although 
the standards that ultimately ground obligations—standards for caring—always apply to moral 
agents at times, collective obligation of this sort are functions of such demands in the same way 
as individual obligations are. Moreover, these collective obligations imply capability in just the 
same way as individual obligations: if a group has an obligation to φ, the group’s φ-ing would 
be ensured, in normal ways, by appropriate caring.11 
 Because OBLIGATION takes group obligations to consist in a number of agents together 
standing in a certain relation to φ-ing, I will describe these as “shared” obligations. Notice that 
such obligations are essentially shared. To see this, compare two cases where an individual 
teenager cannot help the cat down the tree because at least two people are required to erect the 
ladder and because there is no help available. In the first case there is no help available because 
the teenager is there alone; in the second case because everyone else present is unwilling to help. 
In neither case does she have a regular individual obligation to help the cat—she cannot—but 
in the second, she might share an obligation with the others to do so. The latter possibility also 
illustrates how shared obligations do not consist in regular individual obligations to achieve 
some end together with others: given the unwillingness of others, she has no individual 
obligation to help. (Björnsson 2014b, Forthcoming) 
 Thus far I have argued that given an independently supported understanding of 
obligations, collective obligations of a certain kind—shared obligations—are entirely non-
mysterious. But three questions remain, neither of which has an obvious answer: 
Shared obligations depend on what appropriate caring among individual agents would 
ensure. But given INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY, why would such individuals be motivated to 
contribute? 
Given that shared obligations depend on what individuals would be motivated to do if 
caring appropriately, how can COLLECTIVE CAPABILITY ground a shared obligation? 
                                               
10 One might worry in general whether the possibility of bringing about some important effect through 
a series of uncoordinated actions really provides the sort of control needed to ground obligation 
(Lawford-Smith 2015, 233–35; cf. Pinkert 2014; Schwenkenbecher 2014, 68–69). But notice that the 
effects by uncoordinated actions need not come about by chance: they are normal upshots of separate 
behaviors all guided by the value realized or promoted by the effect. 
11 Though unstructured groups can be subjects of the OBLIGATION variety of moral obligations, only 
groups of which it can be properly demanded that they care about doing certain things are subject to 
the GENERAL and PRO TANTO varieties, as defined above. Some resistance to the idea that unstructured 
groups can have obligations (e.g. that of Collins 2013) might be best understood as concerned with 
something like the latter rather than with OBLIGATION obligations. I thank Stephanie Collins for 
discussion of this issue. 
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Given INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY, how can the considerations grounding COLLECTIVE 
OBLIGATION also ground individual obligations to contribute?  
I address these questions in the following two sections, focusing on the issue of threatening 
climate catastrophe. 
 
5. COLLECTIVE OBLIGATION in spite of INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY 
Our account of shared obligations might seem to make straightforward sense of COLLECTIVE 
OBLIGATION for the case of threatening climate catastrophe. First, according to OBLIGATION, 
we have a moral obligation to significantly reduce that threat insofar as our caring appropriately 
would ensure, in a normal way, that we do. Second, it seems plausible that we can be properly 
required to care about things threatened by climate change, in particular the wellbeing of people 
in areas most likely to be hit the hardest by flooding, drought, social unrest, disease, and war. 
Of course, our production and use of energy will have to change radically in a generation, 
imposing significant costs on many people. But key technologies have developed swiftly even 
without costly measures, and more forceful policy changes, should such receive widespread 
support, would speed up the process even more. Given the magnitude of what is at stake, surely 
the required sacrifices can be demanded.12 
 On reflection, though, INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY might seem to undermine this 
conclusion. Given how small an impact we can expect of an individual agent’s actions on overall 
preventive success—given INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY—it is unclear why climate threat should 
prompt even moderately costly action among appropriately caring individuals. That issue is the 
topic of this section. 
 An obvious first answer is that although we are extremely unlikely to make any major 
difference with respect to the grand outcome that is the object of COLLECTIVE OBLIGATION, the 
difference we can make is not thereby morally irrelevant. We might cut down on our carbon 
footprint, support emission reduction schemes to offset what remains, vote for politicians that 
support important climate legislation, support climate friendly technologies by our everyday 
choices, and help spread awareness of the risks and what needs to be done. Taking these steps, 
one might think, would likely make some contribution in positive direction. After all, whatever 
threat reduction is eventually achieved will in significant part be achieved by a multitude of such 
steps. Given appropriate caring, this could motivate enough action to ensure significant overall 
reduction. 
 I will argue that this is indeed a sensible perspective, but it too might seem to exaggerate 
the role we can play as individuals. The first problem is that many of the systems that we operate 
in have what we might call “buffer zones,” i.e. ranges within which differences in input values 
make no difference to the overall outcome. Voting is the most familiar example: unless an 
                                               
12 Exact estimates of sacrifices needed from IPCC and others vary considerably depending on what 
assumptions are made, but estimates for quick and decisive global action suggest individual burdens 
falling far short of costs regularly paid by countless people because of changes in labor market conditions 
force relocation or periods of joblessness: noticeable burdens. For one recent argument that costs are 
reasonable, see Stern 2015. 
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election is as close as can be, no one individual vote will make a difference as to who wins. The 
likelihood that my vote will make a difference in an election with millions of voters is thus 
typically vanishingly small, especially where reliable advance polling indicates a clear winner. 
But numerous natural and human systems display similar buffering, with corresponding effects 
on likelihoods: it might seem extremely unlikely that my emissions of greenhouse gases will cause 
a vanishingly small increase in temperature or sea level rise that in turn makes a difference 
whether an area is hit by drought or forest fires, whether someone dies from dehydration or 
overheating, or whether flood barriers resist the forces of waves. Moreover, it might seem that 
unless one’s actions make some concrete identifiable difference with respect to some value—
unless it harms an identifiable human being, say—that value cannot make performing or 
abstaining from these actions morally obligatory (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, 289–94). 
 Perhaps this sort of difficulty suggests that focus on the effects or difference-making of 
individual actions is a mistake, as well as a bad fit with the activist’s perspective. Perhaps we 
should also care about not adding to sets of actions that together cause significant identifiable 
harm, and care about adding to sets of actions that together delivers significant identifiable 
goods. To capture this wider sense of causal relevance, let us say that an individual action 
“contributes” to some outcome if it is part of why the outcome came about. (Understand 
“action” so as to include omissions.) An action can thus contribute to an outcome without 
making a difference to it, as illustrated by cases where the outcome is the joint effect of numerous 
actions neither of which was necessary for the outcome. With this terminology, the suggestion 
might be put as follows: 
 
MERE CONTRIBUTION: If one cares appropriately about some important outcome and 
thinks that actions by a group of people can significantly promote (obstruct) that outcome, 
one cares about contributing to its promotion (obstruction), even if one will not thereby 
make a significant difference to whether it is realized.13 
 
Given MERE CONTRIBUTION, it is clear why individuals would care about not adding to the 
excess of greenhouse gases and about supporting pro-environmental policies. Depending on the 
strength of the required caring, this could conceivably ensure a significant reduction of climate 
threat. 
 Some would accept a principle like MERE CONTRIBUTION only for the special case where 
the contributor intends a collective harm as a means or an end (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, 
289–90). Perhaps they should generalize: as Chad Vance (forthcoming) has argued, a harm that 
is merely foreseen can be as serious as one that is intended (though Vance allows that the former 
might be more easily offset by some greater good). For cases involving collective benefits rather 
than harms, Julia Nefsky (2016; cf. Parfit 1984, 83) has recently defended a principle related to 
MERE CONTRIBUTION. However, she notes that without restriction such principles imply that a 
valuable outcome can provide an agent with reasons to contribute even when it is known that 
                                               
13 For considerations that might seem to motivate MERE CONTRIBUTION, see Brennan and Sayre-
McCord 2015, 53–54; Petersson 2004; Parfit 1984, ch. 3. 
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enough has already been done to secure that outcome. Finding this consequence implausible, 
she proposes that the principle applies only to contributions that satisfy 
 
NON-SUPERFLUITY: An action is non-superfluous with respect to an outcome if and only if it 
is possible at the time of action that it will contribute to the outcome and possible that the 
outcome fails to materialize for lack of such contributions (Nefsky 2016, §4).  
 
Perhaps a similar restriction makes sense for cases of foreseen collective harm. If the actions that 
others have taken have already ensured the harm, it is unclear why concern with that harm 
should motivate an agent not to perform another action of the relevant kind. (The agent might 
of course have reason to avoid such actions under certain circumstances—perhaps doing so will 
have powerful symbolic effects, say—but then it is not the mere contribution to harm that provides 
such reason.) 
 On further reflection, however, even non-superfluous mere contributions might seem to 
count for nil. Consider:  
 
Unhelpful Contribution: I see two people trying to save a drowning man from the violent 
waves onto the rocky shore. I can contribute to the effort, and so can another bystander, 
whom I recognize as an off-duty lifeguard. He seems unwilling to get involved, but if he 
did, the man would most likely be saved. I am less suited for the task, however, having 
little experience with this sort of situation. If I got involved, my contribution would ever 
so slightly decrease the chance of success or at the very least complicate the situation for 
the others. 
 
In this case, my effort to aid the rescue could very well be non-superfluous parts of the cause of 
a successful outcome: if the man was brought ashore alive it could be because of our efforts. 
Even so, it is unclear why an appropriate concern with the man’s life and the success of the 
rescue should motivate any such effort on my part. In fact, no matter how marginal the negative 
effect would be of getting involved, it would seem enough to counteract whatever positive value 
would be added by my non-superfluous contribution. The most straightforward explanation for 
this seems to be that such contributions add no value of their own (cf. Parfit 1984, 83; Dietz 
2016, 974–75). Likewise for cases involving mere contributions to harm: 
 
Unhelpful Abstention: Watching people climb onto the lifeboats, I can see that one is filled 
over capacity, enough so that this might sink it if the waves get any higher. By climbing 
onboard myself, I would weigh it down further still. But unlike the others, I know how to 
balance and steer a lifeboat to best keep it afloat. If I climb on, it would be slightly less 
likely to sink. 
 
If I get onboard, the lifeboat might still sink because too many people climbed onboard, in 
which case I would have non-superfluously contributed to the wreck. However, if this 
contribution has any negative value in itself, it seems outweighed by even the slightest decrease 
in risk that would come from getting onboard. This suggests that contributing non-superfluously 
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to bad outcomes has no inherent negative value, and that it would be unreasonable to demand 
that people care about not so contributing. 
 If non-superfluous mere contributions to harm are not morally bad, we have no obligation 
to avoid them. Still, I take it that we often do find such contributions intuitively problematic. 
Perhaps this has a simple explanation: if one cares about something, one will be instinctually 
averse to contributing to what is significantly risking to harm it, i.e. averse in ways not relying 
on an overall assessment of the risk of making the harm worse or more likely. Such an aversion 
would make good sense. These contributions are antecedently highly likely to increase the risk 
or extent of the harm, and so typically worth rejecting prior to engaging in detailed assessments 
of probabilities and values of outcomes of various alternative actions. (Similarly, some 
instinctual aversion to public speaking or heights make sense given the risks typically involved 
in subjecting oneself to the judgment of many or placing oneself where one has an unobstructed 
view of ground far below.) If this aversion explains why mere contributions of morally relevant 
harms often strike us as morally problematic, we also have an explanation of why intuitions fail 
to support a simple principle like MERE CONTRIBUTION. For such an instinctual aversion will 
weaken when the action is no longer saliently seen as a contribution to a threatening harm and 
we move to other modes of evaluation. This will happen when the harm is already seen as a 
done deal and the action as saliently superfluous, in line with Nefsky’s observation, or when the 
action is seen as decreasing the risk of the very harm to which it might contribute, as in Unhelpful 
Abstention. 
 Interestingly, OBLIGATION suggests that an instinctual aversion of this kind can itself 
ground prima facie obligations not to significantly risk contributing to moral harm unless this is 
saliently superfluous or decreases the risk for harm: First, appropriate caring would often ensure 
that we avoid such risks. Second, because such risks increase the antecedent likelihood of harm, 
there is general moral reason to prevent them, and they are thus morally bad in the 
OBLIGATION-relevant sense. For analogous reasons, we might have corresponding obligations 
to contribute to harm prevention. We seem to be instinctively motivated to help prevent harm 
that we care about, unless this is saliently superfluous or increases the risk of the harm (as in 
Unhelpful Contribution), and this will often ensure that we do help. Moreover, not helping under 
such circumstances can be morally bad because it tends to increase the risk of harm. Thus: 
 
OBLIGATIONS (NOT) TO CONTRIBUTE: One has a prima facie obligation to contribute to 
the prevention of a significant moral harm unless this is saliently superfluous or increases 
the risk of harm. One has a prima facie obligation not to contribute to significant moral 
harm unless this is saliently superfluous or decreases the risk for harm.14 
 
Instinctual motivation of these kinds goes some way towards explaining why, if we cared 
appropriately about the harms of climate change, many of us would take net emission reducing 
steps that together ensured significant prevention and mitigation in spite of INDIVIDUAL 
INCAPABILITY. However, because the strength of this motivation relies on the salience of the 
                                               
14 Something similar can perhaps also be said about contributions to collective benefits rather than to 
the prevention of harms, though my sense is that instincts to contribute to benefits are weaker. 
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contribution to harm, and because individual contributions to clear climate related harms are 
abstract and diffuse, the obligations will likely be weak, leaving us well shy of a full explanation.  
 An important complementary response to the worry about buffer zones relies on the fact 
that even highly unlikely outcomes matter if they are significant enough (see e.g. Parfit 1984, 
73–75; Hiller 2011; Kagan 2011; Singer 1980; Lawford-Smith 2016). Our decisions should 
arguably be guided by the effect of available alternatives on something like expected value (i.e. on 
the sum of the products of the value of each of the possible outcomes and their probability). 
Assuming that this is correct, suppose that the minute difference in greenhouse gases that I 
might affect has some non-zero likelihood of affecting the occurrence or extent of forest fires, 
droughts, or whether someone dies of dehydration or overheating, and so forth. Even if each 
such effect is extremely unlikely, there are plausibly a staggering number of possibilities for such 
effects, each individually of considerable importance. Moreover, unlike in cases of elections with 
reliable forecasts, it seems that individuals have no way of knowing whether they find themselves 
in buffer zones with respect to the vast majority of these possible effects. Given this, the 
difference in expected value that the individual can make by affecting his own or others’ 
greenhouse gas emissions might still be significant. Of course, in light of the vast complexities, 
any calculation of expected value will have to rely on reasonable heuristics. A first 
approximation might be to look at something like the projected average marginal contribution 
of a given amount of pollution in the range of sufficiently likely outcomes. We might then find 
that the expected negative climate related value of an afternoon worth of gas guzzling joy riding 
is roughly equivalent to that of ruining someone else’s afternoon (cf. Hiller 2011, 355–61). That 
should be reason enough to consider carbon offsetting or alternative sources of enjoyment.15  
 Still, one might think that because of the vast complexity and magnitude of the systems at 
work, no concrete harmful or beneficial effects can be traced back to an individual’s 
contribution such that this particular contribution can be said to be causally responsible for 
those effects  (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, 289–91). Perhaps causation of climate related harm and 
benefit is an emergent phenomenon that cannot be pinned on the quickly dispersed 
contributions of any single individual (Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong 2018, 175–76). And 
perhaps the climate-related consequences of our actions are metaphysically indeterminate 
rather than merely in principle individually unknowable. If so, then even if the expected degree 
of climate-related harm is a positive function of the totality of individual contributions, perhaps 
there is not only low but zero chance that one individual’s contributions will actually have any 
definite harmful or beneficial consequences for anyone. 
 If only the comparative likelihood of concrete, identifiable harmful or beneficial 
consequences of action were relevant for decision-making, this could undermine duties to 
reduce one’s own carbon footprint or to otherwise contribute to prevention. On reflection, 
                                               
15 Some take that these and similar assumptions about expected value to be insufficiently motivated (see 
e.g. Maltais 2013, 593–4; Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong 2018, 178–81). However, since my ambition 
is to make the activist perspective intelligible rather than showing that it is correct, I will not further 
defend them here.  
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though, such consequences are just not required for decision-making relevance, as illustrated 
by: 
 
Carcinogen: It is in your power to determine whether the population in a town of 35,000 
people will be exposed to a carcinogen. Among the people who have the gene in virtue of 
which they risk developing and dying from a certain form of lung cancer, exposure 
increases the average risk of contraction from 50% to 52%, depending in each individual 
case on numerous factors and indeterministic processes. As the expected number of 
townspeople with the gene is 200, exposure increases the expected number of lung cancer 
deaths in the town by 4. 
 
In Carcinogen, it is not clear that exposing people to the carcinogen would in concrete ways harm 
anyone identifiable. For if you did, we cannot say of any of the people who died from lung 
cancer that they would have been better off if you had decided against exposure, only that they 
might have been. Similarly, if you didn’t, we could not say of anyone not developing lung cancer 
that they would have been worse off if you had allowed exposure, only that they might have 
been. Nevertheless, the difference in expected value between the alternatives seems to provide 
an obligation to protect people from exposure absent very strong contrary reasons. In terms of 
OBLIGATION: Acting in ways that increase the number of expected deaths is morally bad, and 
if you cared appropriately about the values and risks at hand, this would ensure, in normal ways, 
that you decide against exposure. Consequently, you have an obligation not to expose people 
to the carcinogen. Moreover, although this obligation is grounded in the general harmfulness 
of the carcinogen, it does not depend on any requirement to avoid identifiable harm—unless 
increasing the risk of harm itself constitutes a harm.16 
                                               
16 Whether increasing the risk that someone is harmed or lowering someone’s expected wellbeing itself 
constitutes harm, or perhaps more weakly injustice, might matter for the strength of the resulting individual 
obligations. If avoiding carbon emissions is merely a matter of improving the state of the world, one 
might think that there are more effective allocations of the resources one would spend: malaria 
prevention, say. But if it is instead a matter of avoiding the violation of negative duties not to harm or 
commit injustice, it might trump positive duties to do good (see Broome 2012, ch. 4–5). I do think that 
when an action increases expected total harm without compensation or justification, it raises to the level 
of injustice. But for the issue that we are currently considering—what individuals would do on the 
assumption that all cared appropriately—this might not matter much: the marginal expected value of 
support for what currently yields most good per dollar would likely quickly go down with enough 
contributions, leaving enough resources to cut net carbon emissions. 
 Even if increased risk for harm or lowered expected value for individuals can be relevant for action, 
one might think that such relevance requires substantially increased risk or lowered expected value for 
those individuals, even if involving a vast number of individuals. (Cf. Julia Nefsky’s (2011) argument that 
minor differences in the distribution of goods might be taken not to make a difference as to whether the 
distribution is fair or not.) Contrary to this, I believe that variations on cases like Carcinogen help bring 
out that small differences in the dimensions that ground large relevant differences are themselves morally 
relevant, albeit typically negligible unless affecting a large number of people. For the sort of argument I 
have in mind, see Barnett 2018: versions of his Staircase argument can be run with individual expected 
values. Cf. discussion of EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION in section 6. 
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 Suppose, as Carcinogen suggests, that we can be required to care about the expected extent 
of harm. Suppose further that, as previously suggested, individual contributions to climate 
catastrophe prevention can significantly affect expected climate related harm. It follows that we 
can have individual obligations to contribute even given INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY. Moreover, 
it suggests that we—affluent people living today, say—share an obligation to significantly reduce 
the threat of climate catastrophe. If all of us care as can be reasonably required of us, we will 
care about our marginal contribution to such threat reduction, and such caring would likely 
ensure significant threat reduction, especially in conjunction with OBLIGATIONS (NOT) TO 
CONTRIBUTE. 
 Of course, I have not yet said anything about how strongly individuals should care about 
such effects, or how much action could be expected. The caring required might depend on 
individuals’ capacity to contribute, their degree of (retrospective) responsibility for the situation, 
and the extent to which they have disproportionally benefitted from the system that has given 
rise to the threat (for a catalogue of possible factors, see Björnsson and Brülde 2017). How much 
action will be ensured given a certain level of caring will in turn depend on the costs involved 
and competing considerations. Though it is not part of the current argument, it is entirely 
possible that for those of us who belong in the global 1%, caring appropriately will dispose us 
to considerably lower our material standards of living. But setting this possibility aside, it is easy 
to see how uniform moderate caring could ensure significant effects. Little or no sacrifice of 
personal wellbeing is involved in staying somewhat informed or helping raise awareness and 
spread relevant information, on one’s own or together with others. Similarly, little sacrifice is 
involved in ranking climate policy as particularly important when casting votes in close 
elections, offsetting one’s carbon emissions, or choosing the climate friendly alternative when 
options are otherwise roughly equivalent. For most affluent people, performing such actions out 
of caring about threat reduction would impose limited material hardships and might well 
involve positive net effects on happiness characteristic of involvement in altruistic causes. Given 
this, it is not wildly implausible that if everyone cared appropriately, this would ensure that a 
vast number of individual actions and widespread support from pro-environmental policies 
would greatly speed up the world’s transition to carbon neutrality, thus significantly reducing 
climate threat. And from this, together with OBLIGATION, it would follow that we have a shared 
obligation to significantly reduce climate threat.17 
                                               
17 I’ve suggested that appropriately caring individuals would take steps jointly sufficient for significant 
threat reduction. But might not individuals who care about climate related harms fail to draw the 
conclusion that they have considerable reason to contribute? After all, as we have seen, a number of 
philosophers reject that conclusion. And if sufficiently many draw the same conclusion, might 
appropriate caring fail to ensure significantly prevent catastrophic climate change, thus undermining 
the idea that prevention is a shared obligation? One response to this worry is to say that the relevant 
standards for caring require caring about the expected value of one’s actions, independent of identifiable 
concrete harm or benefits resulting from these actions. On this view, those failing to contribute because 
they take their inaction to cause no identifiable harm and not caring about expected value would be 
morally to blame. Another response accepts that the worry might indeed undermine shared obligations 
of the OBLIGATION variety and instead say that it is moral demands on caring together with 
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6. Remaining problems of COLLECTIVE CAPABILITY and INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY 
Thus far we have seen how the activist’s attributions of collective obligations can be understood 
as concerned with an OBLIGATION variety of shared obligations. We have also seen reasons to 
think that we have such a shared obligation in the climate case: if we all cared appropriately, 
this could well ensure, in normal ways, that the climate threat is significantly resolved. But 
questions remain. 
 First, to make full sense of the activist’s perspective, we need to explain how the shared 
obligation is relevantly grounded in COLLECTIVE CAPABILITY, as postulated by COLLECTIVE 
OBLIGATION. Importantly, OBLIGATION itself guarantees that we can discharge any shared 
obligation, in the sense that we would discharge it if we cared as can be properly demanded of 
us. But as I understand the activist’s perspective, the grounding claim involves something more: 
we share an obligation to resolve the issue because we are (or should be) aware of our collective 
capacity to resolve it. By contrast, the considerations of capability mentioned in the previous 
section concerned only the individual’s capacity to marginally affect expected climate value. 
More thus needs to be said. 
 Second, according to RESULTING INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION, considerations that ground 
our shared climate obligation also ground individual obligations to help discharge it. The 
problem here concerns the activist’s understanding of what it is to help resolve an issue. What 
makes this problematic is that activists don’t generally think that a given individual’s actions can 
affect whether the issue is resolved, or think that this is what grounds the individual’s obligations: 
such a resolution is too vague and too grand a matter, especially if an individual’s actions might 
have no determinate climate related upshots.18 A first answer, in line with OBLIGATIONS (NOT) 
TO CONTRIBUTE, would that to help is to make a non-superfluous contribution without 
increasing the risk of climate catastrophe. But this fails to account for the activist’s sense that 
individual contributions can be more or less effective in helping to resolve the grand issue. 
 In this final section, I explain how concerns about important large-scale outcomes and 
considerations of collective capability with respect to such outcomes can intelligibly enter into 
ordinary individual practical reasoning and make intelligible individual efforts to efficiently help 
realize these outcomes. Such concerns and considerations, I suggest, play natural roles in what 
might be the most common mode of practical reasoning: what I will call issue-oriented reasoning. 
Simplifying somewhat, such reasoning paradigmatically proceeds through the following steps: 
 
                                               
rationality that require giving weight to expected value. Based on this, one could then say we have a shared 
obligation under the following, OBLIGATION-related, excuse-friendly, notion of obligation: 
OBLIGATION*: One or more individuals have a moral obligation to φ if and only if their not φ-ing 
would be morally bad and their φ-ing would be ensured, in a normal way, by the appropriate 
caring and teleologically rationally of them all. 
18 Given that agents can marginally affect climate related expected value, it might be hard to deny that 
they can marginally affect the likelihood of resolution given various complete precisifications of what 
counts as a “resolution.” But I do not take that thought to be a natural part of the activist’s perspective. 
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ISSUE-ORIENTED REASONING 
Identification of an issue, i.e. some good or bad possibility whose realization might be helped 
or hindered. 
Identification of one or more possible means by which that realization might be helped or 
hindered. A means may be non-agential: the threatening forest fire might be put out by 
rain; the tyrant’s reign ended by cardiac arrest. But it will typically involve an agent or 
group of agents, which may or may not be identified and may or may not involve the 
agent engaged in reasoning.19 Means might also be more or less abstractly understood, 
ranging from the broadest outline of what needs to happen to help or hinder the possibility 
in question to plans painstakingly detailing what would be done by everyone and 
everything involved.  
Evaluation of means with respect to effectiveness, likelihood of realization (perhaps 
conditional upon the active involvement of the reasoner) and various cost and benefits. 
Costs saliently include resources used, and both costs and benefits can include moral 
considerations, such as unfairness or fairness in the distribution of costs or in how people 
are used, and whether the actions involved go beyond or is in accordance with what can 
be reasonably demanded of people. In the case of climate threat reduction, the fairness or 
justice of means might depend on assessments of the individual agents’ capacity to help 
effectively as well her prior reliance on more than her fair share of Earth’s limited capacity 
to harmlessly absorb greenhouse gas emissions (see e.g. Baatz 2014; cf. the extensive 
discussion of “polluter pays” and “beneficiary pays” principles in environmental 
economics, law, and ethics). Evaluations might lead to rejection or refinement of means, 
and the identification of the best possible or only acceptable means. If moral and other 
costs of available means do not stand in proportion to the target outcome—to keep the 
risk of the direst catastrophe scenarios under 1%, say—or if the likelihood of success is 
insignificant, the target might be raised or lowered and the costs recalculated. 
Identification of ways that the individual can further a certain means, by making it more likely to be 
implemented, raising its likelihood of success, or otherwise improving on it. Such ways 
can be more or less abstractly understood. 
Evaluation of ways of promoting means, with respect to the same range of considerations as 
evaluation of means. Can lead to rejection or refinements of certain ways. Can also lead 
to reevaluation of means, as prior evaluations might have relied on now rejected 
assumption about reasoner’s input. 
Individual decision about what to do about the issue, if anything. 
 
We can easily see how both considerations of collective capability and judgments of shared 
obligations have a natural home in such reasoning. When appropriately caring individuals 
become aware of the sort of issue that the activist’s perspective concerns, they will tend to engage 
in issue-oriented reasoning. Because of the scale of the issue, potentially effective means 
                                               
19 As should be clear from this outline, the sort of reasoning I have in mind here is neither “we-mode” 
nor “I-mode” reasoning (in the terms of Tuomela 2007), though it might conceivably involve either. 
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characteristically involve great many people, making considerations of collective capability 
highly relevant. At this stage, it might also matter whether reasonable demands on the agents 
involved would ensure realization of the means—whether the realization is a shared 
obligation—as this might affect whether the means can likely be realized in a morally acceptable 
fashion. 
 To see how individuals who have taken this perspective can also rightly see their own 
actions as more or less effective and helpful contributions to such collective means, we need two 
more general ideas. The first, which has already been alluded to, is that: 
 
HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION: A contribution to an important outcome can be helpful both 
by increasing the likelihood of the outcome and by improving the means by which the 
outcome is reached. 
 
Correspondingly, appropriately caring agents will be motivated to contribute not only in ways 
that make a valuable outcome more likely, but also in ways that make reaching it easier, faster, 
cheaper, safer, involving a fairer distribution of efforts, and so forth. In line with this, we have 
already noted that an individual agent can make a difference to how fairly the threat of climate 
catastrophe is resolved, by not using more than her fair share of a vital common resource and 
by not unjustifiably reducing the expected wellbeing of others. 
 How, though, can the individual contribution be rationally directed at and tailored to 
efficiently help achieve a certain end when the contribution cannot significantly affect the 
likelihood that it is achieved? The answer is provided by something like the following plausible 
principle: 
 
EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION: An action or omission is an effective contribution to an 
outcome to the degree that it increases the extent to which the outcome is realized. 
 
Some outcomes are perhaps naturally understood as being either fully realized or not at all: 
preventing a fascist politician from getting a cabinet position, say, or becoming pregnant. For 
such outcomes, a contribution is either fully effective, or not at all. Other outcomes, however, 
are naturally understood as involving the realization of enough of some underlying dimension 
that can be realized to degrees. Some such outcomes are probabilistic: your goal to decrease the 
likelihood that a fascist gets a cabinet position or that you or your partner becomes pregnant. If 
so, a contribution is effective to the extent that it affects the likelihood in question. Others are 
non-probabilistic. You might strive to be well-educated, fair-minded, or wealthy, and 
contributions to those ends are more effective the more they add to your degree of education, 
fair-mindedness, or wealth. Or you might be working for a decisive election win, or a cancer 
treatment that prevents or reverses tumor growth, in which case a contribution might be more 
effective the more votes it adds to the victory or the more it prevents or reverses growth, 
respectively. Given this understanding of effectiveness, the efficiency of a contribution can simply 
be understood in terms of the costs involved in achieving a certain degree of effectiveness. 
  Importantly, this understanding of degrees of effectiveness and efficiency applies even 
when, because of the large-scale vagueness of the outcome, no individual action will decide 
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whether the outcome is realized: whether you will now be well educated, or whether the victory 
was now decisive. For this reason, EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION also makes clear how 
contributions towards significantly reducing climate threat can be more or less effective and 
efficient depending on how they affect expected climate related value. 
 We have now seen how considerations of collective capability can ground both a shared 
obligation to significantly reduce climate threat and individual obligations to contribute to such 
reduction, in spite of INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY. Appropriately caring individuals who become 
aware of an issue like this will consider means of resolution that involve groups of people who 
can resolve the issue. Such individuals will also be motivated to perform actions that are 
helpful—efficient and fair—contributions to threat resolution even if they do not see their own 
contribution as increasing its likelihood. 
 What is missing for a complete account of RESULTING INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION are 
reasons to think that if an individual in the relevant group (the affluent, say) would care 
appropriately, she would be significantly motivated to make helpful contributions, grounding 
an individual prima facie obligation to do so. In section 5, I argued that if we all cared 
appropriately, enough of us would perform actions increasing climate related expected value 
for these actions to significantly resolve the threat of climate catastrophe. It seems painfully 
obvious, however, that many people care very little and are unwilling to contribute, and one 
might worry that this undermines what the appropriately caring individual can be expected to 
do. The worry concerns both efficiency and fairness. If others are not doing their part, it is both 
unclear whether doing my part will be a comparatively efficient way of contributing to a 
resolution and unclear how things are made fairer if I incur the cost of doing my part.20  
 On reflection, though, matters are not quite that bleak. Not only is there still a good chance 
that enough individuals will each act in ways that marginally increase climate related expected 
value and together significantly reduce climate threat, judging by progress over the last few 
years. Much has also been done to provide cognitive and material infrastructures that make 
helpful contributions both convenient and inexpensive, at least for the affluent among us. There 
are increasingly efficient renewable energy sources, improved low-emission technologies, and 
detailed sophisticated scientific assessments of both risks and the effects of various policies. 
There are also policies and services in place that make it easy for individuals to choose climate 
friendlier options, vote for and otherwise support climate-friendly politicians and policies, or 
inexpensively offset their carbon footprint. Efficiency should thus not in general be a worry. 
Considerations relevant to fairness also do not seem significantly affected by current reluctance 
to contribute. That others are using or benefitting from more than their fair share of a common 
resource without trying to compensate others does not obviously mean that I should not care 
about not going beyond my fair share. It thus makes good sense to assume that, in spite of fairly 
widespread tendencies not to take the threat of climate catastrophe seriously, and in spite of 
INDIVIDUAL INCAPABILITY, we do have individual prima facie obligations to help achieve 
                                               
20  For general concerns about obligations under conditions of futility, see Budolfson unpublished 
manuscript; cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2005. The argument of section 5 rejected the idea that individual 
contributions to climate threat resolution are futile given that others care appropriately. 
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resolution, obligations grounded in the same facts as our shared obligation. In light of this, 
RESULTING INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION seems perfectly reasonable. 
 
This concludes my attempt to make sense of central aspects of the activist’s perspective, with a 
specific focus on our climate obligations. In sections 3 and 4, I explained why there need not be 
anything inherently mysterious about shared obligations. Such obligations have the same basic 
structure as individual obligations and do not require that the group in question is itself a bona 
fide moral agent. In section 5, I argued that we likely have a shared obligation to significantly 
resolve the threat of climate catastrophe, as many of us can significantly affect climate related 
expected value. In this section, finally, I have explained how this shared obligation would be 
based in part on the recognition that we are collectively able to significantly resolve the issue, 
and how individuals can have obligations to help achieve climate threat resolution even though 
they cannot affect its likelihood. Both considerations of collective capability and attempts to 
help achieve a collective solution to a large-scale problem have natural homes in ordinary issue-
oriented practical reasoning. If the arguments are correct, the activist’s perspective thus remains 
reasonable in spite of the size and complex nature of the threat at hand and the largely 
disorganized group of agents to which it attributes both shared and individual obligations. 
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